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PROTECTING FREEDOM TO MANIFEST 
ONE’S RELIGION OR BELIEF: 
STRASBOURG OR LUXEMBOURG?
Erica Howard*
Abstract
Persons who want to manifest their religion through the wearing of religious symbols but 
who are prohibited from doing so appear to be unlikely to be successful in challenging 
these prohibitions under Articles 9 or 14 ECHR before the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg, although very recent case law might tentatively suggest a shift  
in this approach. Th is article gives an overview of this case law, including the recent 
judgment in Eweida and others v. the United Kingdom, and this is followed by an 
analysis of a number of arguments which suggest that a challenge to bans on the wearing 
of religious symbols would have more chance of being successful in the Court of Justice of 
the European Union in Luxembourg.
Keywords: ECHR; EU law; freedom of religion; manifestations of religion or belief; 
religious discrimination
1. INTRODUCTION
In a number of cases, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (the 
Strasbourg Court or ECtHR), the Court tasked with overseeing the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 
(ECHR), has been asked to decide whether bans on the wearing of religious symbols1 
are a breach of the freedom to manifest one’s religion contrary to Article 9 ECHR 
and/or the right to non-discrimination in Article 14 ECHR. Th e Strasbourg Court has 
left  a wide margin of appreciation to States in these cases and, although it generally 
fi nds an interference with these rights, it usually considers this interference to be 
* All websites were last visited on 1 March 2014.
1 Th e term ‘religious symbol’ will be used to indicate a symbol which signifi es an important part of a 
person’s religious identity. It includes symbols worn because of a religious obligation or linked to or 
inspired by a person’s religion or belief.
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justifi ed. Th e Strasbourg Court seems, as will be discussed below, to readily accept 
the justifi cation brought forward by the State Party. A person aff ected by the bans is 
therefore unlikely to be successful in claiming an infringement of their human rights 
before this Court, although very recent case law might tentatively suggest a shift  in 
this approach. But would a challenge of bans on the wearing of religious symbols have 
more chance of being successful in the Court of Justice of the European Union2 in 
Luxembourg? Will the latter decide these cases diff erently and be more willing to fi nd 
a breach of human rights or anti-discrimination law? A number of arguments suggest 
that the Luxembourg Court might deal with bans on religious symbols in a diff erent 
way from the Strasbourg Court and fi nd that these are not justifi ed under EU law.
Th is article starts with an overview of the case law of the Strasbourg Court on bans 
on the wearing of religious symbols, including an examination of the justifi cation test 
applied under both Articles 9 and 14 ECHR. It then proceeds with an analysis of the 
arguments which suggest that the Luxembourg Court, if called upon to do so, could 
very well deal with these bans in a diff erent way by applying a stricter justifi cation 
test, which makes a fi nding that these bans are not justifi ed under EU law more likely. 
Th ese arguments are, fi rst, that EU law does not generally allow for justifi cation of 
direct discrimination except in certain, clearly prescribed circumstances. Second, the 
Luxembourg Court has consistently held that restrictions on the rights laid down in the 
EU anti-discrimination directives must be interpreted strictly. Th ird, the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights expressly states that the EU can go beyond the provisions of 
the ECHR. And, fourth, the Luxembourg Court is generally more concerned with 
a uniform application of EU law, while the Strasbourg Court gives States a certain 
margin of appreciation. In the conclusion, an attempt is made to answer two 
questions: whether it is likely that the Luxembourg Court will provide a better route 
to successfully claim a violation against bans on the wearing of religious symbols and 
whether the recent tentative shift  in approach in the Strasbourg Court might mean 
that the latter route could, in the future, be more successful as well. In other words, 
which court, Strasbourg or Luxembourg, would provide the best protection for those 
people who want to wear a religious symbol but who are prohibited from doing so?
It must be noted that it is much easier for an individual to reach the Strasbourg 
Court, because that Court can ‘receive applications from any person, non-
governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of 
a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the 
Convention or the Protocols thereto’ (Article 34 ECHR). Th erefore, an individual 
aff ected by a ban on the wearing of religious symbols can apply directly to the 
Strasbourg Court, once all domestic remedies are exhausted. In contrast, the right 
2 Th ere are three strands to the court system in the EU: the Court of Justice, the General Court and 
the specialised courts in specifi c areas. Th e Court of Justice gives rulings on requests for preliminary 
rulings and, as mentioned below, a case on bans of religious symbols would reach the EU courts in 
this way, so, in the following, ‘the Luxembourg Court’ refers to the Court of Justice of the EU. Any 
references in quotes to the ECJ are also to this Court.
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of individuals to take direct action in the Luxembourg Court is limited to situations 
where EU decisions or actions are addressed to them or are of individual or direct 
concern to them (Article  263 TFEU). Th is does not cover cases where public or 
private institutions in a Member State have limited the wearing of religious symbols, 
so this procedure cannot be used.
Another way a case can reach the Luxembourg Court is via a preliminary reference 
from a national court. Article 267 TFEU determines that where a question is raised 
before any court or tribunal of a Member State about the interpretation of the Treaties 
or about the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offi  ces or 
agencies of the Union, that court or tribunal may (or sometimes must3), if it considers 
that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the 
Luxembourg Court to give a ruling on the question. However, it is ultimately up to 
the national court to decide on this and an individual claimant cannot force a court 
to do so.
Another problem could arise from the fact that the national court, when requesting 
a preliminary ruling, formulates questions for the Luxembourg Court to answer. 
Th erefore, even if a national court requests a preliminary ruling, the question(s) 
asked by the national court might limit what the Luxembourg Court can decide on. 
Although, it has been argued that this Court does not always hold itself to be strictly 
bound by the referred questions from the national court.4
So it might be diffi  cult to get a case referred to the Luxembourg Court, and, 
although cases concerning the interpretation of Directive 2000/78/EC,5 do reach this 
Court,6 none of these cases, to date, relate to religious discrimination. However, this 
is not to say that a reference relating to religious discrimination and its interpretation 
will not be made in the future.
An example of a case that could – and, it is suggested, should – have been referred 
to the Luxembourg Court is the British case of Eweida v. British Airways.7 Eweida was 
3 If such a question is raised before a court/tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial 
remedy under national law, the court/tribunal must bring the matter before the Luxembourg Court.
4 See on this Sarah Haverkort-Speekenbrink, European Non-discrimination Law A Comparison 
of EU Law and the ECHR in the Field of Non-Discrimination and Freedom of Religion in Public 
Employment with an Emphasis on the Islamic Headscarf Issue (Intersentia Ltd 2012) 82–83 and 254.
5 Council Directive (EC) 2000/78 Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in 
Employment and Occupation [2000] OJ L 303/16. Th is Directive prohibits discrimination on the 
ground of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation.
6 See, for example, Case 144/04 Mangold v Helm, [2005] ECR I-9981 (age); Case 13/05 Chacon Navas v 
Eurest Colectividades SA, [2006] ECR I-6467 (disability); Case 555/07 Kucukdeveci v Swedex GmbH 
& Co KG, [2010] ECR I-365 (age); Case 147/08 Jurgen Romer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, 
[2011] ECR I-3591 (sexual orientation); Cases 335/11 and 337/11 Ring and Skouboe Werge, judgment 
11/04/2013 (disability).
7 Eweida v British Airways Plc [2009] IRLR 78 (EAT); [2010] EWCA Civ 80 (CA). Eweida took her 
case to the Strasbourg Court, where it was heard with 3 other cases against the UK, see Eweida 
and Others v the United Kingdom App nos 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10 10 (ECHR, 
27 May 2013). Th is case will be discussed further below.
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employed by British Airways as check-in staff . When a new uniform was adopted, 
Eweida was not allowed to wear a small silver cross in a visible manner with her uniform. 
She complained, among other issues, of indirect discrimination on the ground of her 
religious belief. Th is claim was rejected by both the Employment Tribunal (ET) and the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) because Eweida had not shown that the uniform 
requirement put persons of the same religion at a disadvantage.8 Th e EAT held that, 
for a fi nding of indirect discrimination, the disadvantage must be suff ered by others 
who share her religion or belief and thus that indirect discrimination required group 
disadvantage.9 Th is was confi rmed by the Court of Appeal which concluded that the 
term ‘persons’, both in the British Regulations and in Directive 2000/78/EC, could not 
be read as including a single person.10
However, it can be argued that Directive 2000/78/EC does not require group 
disadvantage for a fi nding of indirect discrimination. According to Bamforth et al. 
and the British Equality and Human Rights Commission, the wording in the Directive 
‘would put persons […]’ suggests that indirect discrimination could potentially occur 
when only one person defi ned by the particular characteristic was put at a disadvantage 
and thus that there is no requirement of group disadvantage.11 Th is would mean that 
British law is interpreted in a more restrictive way than EU law.
It is suggested that the question of whether indirect discrimination requires 
group disadvantage should have been referred to the Luxembourg Court via a 
preliminary reference. Counsel for Eweida should have raised this question about the 
interpretation of Directive 2000/78/EC and the compatibility of the British defi nition 
of indirect discrimination with the Directive. Although it would still have been up to 
the national court to decide to do so or not, if it had done so, this could have led to a 
clarifi cation by the Luxembourg Court of indirect discrimination, one of the central 
terms in EU anti-discrimination law.
Th erefore, cases could reach the Luxembourg Court via a preliminary ruling and 
there is a clear role for advocates/representatives in national cases to raise questions 
concerning EU law. But, as mentioned above, because an individual can take cases 
8 Th e Employment Equality (Religion and Belief) Regulations 2003 were applicable at the time. Reg. 
3(1)(b) on indirect discrimination determined that a provision, criterion or practice which ‘puts or 
would put persons of B’s [the person suff ering the discrimination] religion or belief at a particular 
disadvantage compared with others’. Th e same formulation can now be found in S 19(2) of the 
Equality Act 2010.
9 Eweida (EAT) (n 7) paras 11 and 61.
10 Eweida (CA) (n 7) para 15. Th is was followed in Chaplin v. Royal Devon & Exeter NHS Foundation 
Trust [2010] Employment Tribunal, Case no: 17288862009 (6 April 2010).
11 Nicholas Bamforth, Maleiha Malik and Colm O’Cinneide, Discrimination Law: Th eory and 
Context Text and Materials (Sweet and Maxwell 2008) 307–308; Submission of the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission in the European Court of Human Rights Eweida and Chaplin v the 
United Kingdom App nos 48420/10 and 59842/10, (ECHR 2012) < www.equalityhumanrights.com/
uploaded_fi les/legal/ehrc_submission_to_ecthr_sep_2011.pdf; See further on this Erica Howard, 
‘Reasonable Accommodation of Religion and Other Discrimination Grounds in EU law’ (2013) 
38(3) European Law Review, 360, 367–370.
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directly to the Strasbourg Court, it is much easier and thus much more likely for a case 
to reach the Strasbourg Court than the Luxembourg Court.
In the following the diffi  culties in getting to the Luxembourg Court will be 
ignored and the discussion will be restricted to what could happen if a ban on the 
wearing of religious symbols arrives at that Court. Th is does mean that a comparison 
is made between real cases from the Strasbourg Court and possible future litigation 
on freedom of religion and on religious discrimination in the Luxembourg Court but, 
in this comparison, cases of the Luxembourg Court in relation to the other grounds 
of discrimination covered by EU law will be used where relevant.
2. BANS ON THE WEARING OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS 
UNDER THE ECHR
2.1. ARTICE 9 ECHR
Article  9(1) ECHR guarantees the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
which includes the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief. Article 9(2) ECHR 
determines that the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief can be restricted but 
only if the restriction is prescribed by law and is necessary in a democratic society 
for the protection of public safety, public health or morals or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others. Th erefore, the right to freedom of conscience, 
thought and religion cannot be restricted by a State, but, in certain circumstances, an 
interference with one’s manifestation of religion or belief can be justifi ed.
Because the justifi cation test under Article  9 is very similar to the justifi cation 
test under Article  14 ECHR and to the justifi cation tests under the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and under EU anti-discrimination law, this test will be examined 
in more detail.
Analysing the conditions for justifi cation, ‘prescribed by law’ means that the law 
must be accessible and suffi  ciently precise to make its eff ects foreseeable.12 In two 
cases where French girls were excluded from school because they did not want to 
take off  their Muslim headscarves during sports lessons, the Strasbourg Court held 
that, according to its settled case law, ‘the concept of “law” must be understood in its 
“substantive” sense, not its “formal” one. It therefore includes everything that goes to 
make up the written law, including enactments of lower ranks than statutes’.13
Restrictions on the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief must pursue a 
legitimate aim as summed up in Article 9(2) ECHR: the interests of public safety, the 
protection of public order, health and morals, and the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. A restriction must also be ‘necessary in a democratic society’. 
Th is means that the interference complained of must correspond to a pressing social 
12 See Sunday Times v the United Kingdom App no 6538/74 (ECHR, 26 April 1979) para 42.
13 Kervanci and Dogru v France App nos 31645/04 and 27058/05 (ECHR, 4 December 2008) para 62.
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need; be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and be justifi ed by relevant and 
suffi  cient reasons.14 Evans writes that ‘by proportionate measures the [Strasbourg] 
Court means measures taken by authorities that strike a fair balance between the 
interests of the community and the interests of the individual’.15
Th e Strasbourg Court explained the concept of necessity in Handyside v. the 
United Kingdom, where it noted that the adjective ‘necessary’ is not synonymous 
with ‘indispensable’; neither has it the fl exibility of such expressions as ‘admissible’, 
‘ordinary’, ‘useful’, ‘reasonable’ or ‘desirable’. Th e States Parties enjoy a certain margin 
of appreciation to make the initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social need 
implied by the notion of ‘necessity’ in this context, because the national authorities 
are considered to be better placed to assess what is necessary in a democratic society.16 
But this margin is not unlimited and the Strasbourg Court is empowered to give the 
fi nal ruling.17 In other words, the domestic margin of appreciation goes hand in hand 
with European supervision.
However, the width of this margin is not always the same and it seems that the 
Strasbourg Court allows a wider margin of appreciation in relation to restrictions 
on the freedom to manifest one’s religion in Article 9(2) ECHR than in relation to 
restrictions on rights in other articles, like Article 8 (right to respect for private and 
family life), Article 10 (freedom of expression) and Article 11 (freedom of assembly and 
association), which also contain the condition that a restriction must be ‘necessary in 
a democratic society’.18 A number of factors appear to play a role in determining the 
width of the margin of appreciation aff orded to States by the Strasbourg Court: the 
level of pan-European consensus or the existence of a common standard on the issue 
in Europe, the extent to which the matter interferes with the core of an applicant’s 
private life and the circumstances of the case.19
However, it appears that the level of consensus plays the most important role and, 
in relation to religious issues, the Strasbourg Court has held that ‘it is not possible to 
discern throughout Europe a uniform conception of the signifi cance of religion in 
14 Handyside v the United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECHR, 7 December 1976) paras 48–50. Th is case 
concerned a claim under Article 10(2) ECHR (freedom of expression), but the test has been held 
to be applicable to Article 9(2) as well. See, for example, Dahlab v Switzerland App no 42393/98 
(ECHR, 15 February 2001) under THE LAW, point 1.
15 Malcolm Evans, Manual on the Wearing of Religious Symbols in Public Areas (Council of Europe 
Publishing 2009) 125.
16 Handyside v the United Kingdom (n 14) para 48.
17 Ibid para 49.
18 See for example, Tom Lewis, ‘What not to wear: Religious Rights, the European Court, and the Margin 
of Appreciation’ (2007) 56(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 395, 397–401; and 
Samantha Knights, Freedom of Religion, Minorities and the Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 138.
19 See Steven Greer, Th e Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Human Rights Files 17) (Council of Europe Publishing 2000) 10; 
and, Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press 2001) 143.
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society […] even within a single country such conceptions may vary’.20 Th is absence 
of a common European consensus has led the Strasbourg Court to aff ord States a wide 
margin of appreciation in relation to restrictions on the Article 9 right to manifest 
one’s religion or belief.
2.2. CASE LAW UNDER ARTICLE 9 ECHR
Th e Strasbourg Court now generally holds that the wearing of a religious symbol is a 
manifestation of a person’s religion or belief and then proceeds to an examination of 
the question whether the ban is justifi ed under Article 9(2) ECHR.21
In Dahlab v. Switzerland,22 a teacher in a primary school, aft er converting to Islam, 
started wearing long loose clothing and a hijab or Islamic headscarf. Th e director of 
public education, aft er an inspection, directed her to stop wearing the headscarf in 
school because it was against the strict denominational neutrality of a public, secular 
education system. Dahlab applied to the Strasbourg Court, claiming a violation of 
Articles 9 and 14 (right not to be discriminated against) ECHR.
Th e Strasbourg Court concluded that the wearing of the headscarf was a 
manifestation of Dahlab’s belief but that, under Article  9(2), the interference was 
justifi ed in principle and proportionate to the stated aim of protecting the rights and 
freedoms of others, namely the rights of the children in the school.23 Th e wearing of 
the headscarf might have some proselytising eff ect and was hard to square with the 
principles of tolerance and respect for others and of gender equality.24
In Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, a medical student was not allowed to take her exams 
because she refused to remove her headscarf. Th e Strasbourg Court proceeded on 
the assumption that the regulations in questions constituted an interference with 
Sahin’s manifestation of her religion. Th e Court (both Chamber and Grand Chamber) 
considered that this interference was justifi ed under Article 9(2) because it had a legal 
basis and pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others 
and of protecting public order.25 Th e interference was necessary in a democratic 
society and met a pressing social need by seeking to achieve the constitutional 
principles of secularism and equality.26 Th e State Party (Turkey) was aff orded a wide 
20 Otto-Preminger-Institute v Austria App no 13470/87 (ECHR 20 September 1994) para 50.
21 See Dahlab v Switzerland (n 14); and Leyla Sahin v Turkey App no 44774/98) (ECHR Chamber 29 June 
2004 and ECHR Grand Chamber 10 November 2005). But see the earlier cases of Karaduman and 
Bulut v Turkey App no 16278/90 and 18783/91 (1993) 74 DR 93, where the European Commission of 
Human Rights held that wearing a headscarf is not a manifestation of religion or belief. Protocol 11 
ECHR, which came into force in 1998, abolished the Commission, enlarged the Strasbourg Court 
and allowed individuals to take cases directly to the Court.
22 Dahlab v Switzerland (n 14).
23 Ibid, under THE LAW, point 1.
24 Ibid.
25 Leyla Sahin v Turkey (n 21) paras 66–116 (Chamber) and paras 110–122 (Grand Chamber).
26 Ibid paras 107–109 (Chamber) and para 115 (Grand Chamber).
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margin of appreciation because there was a diversity of approaches taken by the 
national authorities on the wearing of religious symbols in educational institutions.27
In both cases, the Strasbourg Court appeared to defer to the decision of the 
respective State Party that the headscarf formed a threat to State neutrality and the 
secular character of the State and also to the principle of gender equality. Th ere does 
not appear to have been any balancing of the interests of the State with the interests of 
the applicants, nor did the Strasbourg Court pay any attention to what the headscarf 
meant for Ms Dahlab and Ms Sahin themselves. Th e Strasbourg Court thus aff orded 
the States Parties a very wide margin of appreciation and it did not undertake a 
rigorous or objective examination of the necessity or proportionality of the ban in a 
democratic society.28
In Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, judge Tulkens, the dissenting judge in the Grand Chamber, 
criticised the Strasbourg Court where she said that the European supervision that 
must accompany the margin of appreciation ‘seems quite simply to be absent from the 
judgment’ and that this European supervision cannot ‘be escaped simply by evoking 
the margin of appreciation’.29 She also criticised the justifi cation of the wide margin 
of appreciation by the (16) majority judges in this case, namely the lack of European 
consensus about the wearing of religious symbols in educational institutions, because 
‘the comparative-law materials do not allow of such a conclusion, as in none of the 
member States has the ban on wearing religious symbols extended to university 
education, which is intended for young adults, who are less amenable to pressure’.30 
Th is suggests that the absence of a consensus across Europe is used by the Strasbourg 
Court in this case to reduce its scrutiny of the arguments of the (Turkish) State to such 
a low level that it is (almost) absent. Th is seems to confi rm the point made by Edge 
that ‘there is a danger that the broad margin of appreciation justifi ed by European 
27 Ibid para 102 (Chamber) and para 109 (Grand Chamber).
28 See for criticism of these cases: Christopher Decker and Marnie Lloyd, ‘Case Comment Leyla Sahin 
v Turkey’ (2004) 6 European Human Rights Law Review, 672–678, 677; Dawn Lyon and Debora 
Spini, ‘Unveiling the Headscarf Debate’ (2004) 12 Feminist Legal Studies, 333–345, 338; Antje 
Pedain, ‘Case Comment: Do Headscarfs Bite?’ (2004) 63(3) Cambridge Law Journal, 537–540; 
Kerem Altiparmak and Onur Karahanogullari, ‘European Court of Human Rights Aft er Sahin: 
Th e Debate on Headscarves is not Over’ (2006) 2 European Constitutional Law Review, 268–292, 
277–284; Carolyn Evans, ‘Th e “Islamic Scarf” in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 7(1) 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 52, 6 and 11–15; Imen Gallala, ‘Th e Islamic Headscarf: 
An Example of Surmountable Confl ict between Shari’a and the Fundamental Principles of Europe’ 
(2006) 12(5) European Law Journal, 593–612, 601; Sylvie Langlaude, ‘Indoctrination, Secularism, 
Religious Liberty, and the ECHR’ (2006) 55(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
929–944, 930–931 and 936–937; Jill Marshall, ‘Freedom of Religious Expression and Gender 
Equality: Sahin v Turkey’ (2006) 69(3) Modern Law Review, 452–461; Lewis (n 18) 408–409; Peter 
Cumper and Tom Lewis, ‘“Taking Religion Seriously”? Human Rights and Hijab in Europe –Some 
Problems of Adjudication’ (2008–2009) 24 Journal of Law and Religion, 599–627, 609; and Isabelle 
Rorive, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: in Search of a European Answer’ (2009) 30(6) 
Cardozo Law Review, 2669–2698, 2683.
29 Leyla Sahin v Turkey (n 21) (Grand Chamber), Judge Tulkens, dissenting opinion, para 3.
30 Ibid. For the same criticism: Evans (n 28) 5 and 6; Lewis (n 18) 408; and Rorive (n 28) 2682.
Protecting Freedom to Manifest One’s Religion or Belief
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 32/2 (2014) 167
diversity in religious issues could become no more than a mechanism by which 
the Court and Commission can avoid political sensitivities which follow from that 
diversity’.31
Despite the criticism raised against these two cases, the Strasbourg Court appears 
to have continued to aff ord States a wide margin of appreciation in relation to bans 
on the wearing of religious symbols, including headscarves and turbans, and has 
generally held these to be justifi ed in the interest of public order and/or the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others or public safety.32
However, the Strasbourg Court’s judgments in two recent cases might show that 
the margin of appreciation is not unlimited, that there is some European supervision 
aft er all and that the Strasbourg Court is starting to examine the justifi cation 
brought forward by the State Party in a slightly more rigorous way. In Ahmet Arslan 
and Others v. Turkey,33 127 members of a religious group were convicted for touring 
the streets of Ankara while wearing turbans and distinctive trousers and tunic, a 
dress code based on their religious beliefs. Th e Strasbourg Court found a violation 
of Article  9 because the Turkish Government had not convincingly established 
the necessity of the disputed restriction and the interference was not based on 
suffi  cient reasons and thus not justifi ed.34 Th e Strasbourg Court emphasised that 
there was a distinction between wearing religious dress in public areas open to all 
and wearing it in schools or other public establishments where religious neutrality 
might take precedence over the right to manifest one’s religion or belief.35 Th e 
Strasbourg Court also considered that there was no evidence that the applicants had 
represented a threat to public order or that they had been involved in proselytising 
by exerting inappropriate pressure on passers-by.36 Th is not only suggests that the 
Strasbourg Court might hold general bans on religious symbols in all public areas 
31 Peter Edge, ‘Th e European Court of Human Rights and Religious Rights’ (1998) 47(3) International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 680–687, 685.
32 See: Kōse and 93 Others v Turkey App no 26625/02 (ECHR, 24 January 2006) (headscarves) and 
Kurtulmus v Turkey App no 65500/01 (ECHR, 24 January 2006) (headscarf); Kervanci and Dogru 
v France (headscarves) (n 13); Aktas, Bayrak, Gamaleddyn, Ghazal, J. Singh and R. Singh v. France 
App nos 43563/08, 14308/08, 18527/08, 29134/08, 25463/08 and 27561/08 (ECHR, 30  June 2009) 
(headscarves and under-turbans) hereaft er: Aktas and Others v. France; Phull v. France App no 
35753/03 (ECHR, 11 January 2005) (turban); El Morsli v France App no 15585/06 (ECHR, 4 March 
2008) (veil); and Mann Singh v France App no 24479/04 (ECHR 27 November 2008) 152. Th e latter 
case concerned a Sikh man who was refused a duplicate driving licence because he did not want 
to submit a photo of himself without his turban. Note that the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee found a violation of the freedom of religion under Article 18 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights in a case with very similar facts regarding a photo for a residence permit 
(HRC Ranjit Singh v France (22 July 2011) CCPR/C/102/D/1876/2009.
33 Ahmet Arslan and Others v Turkey App no 41135/98 (ECHR, 23  February 2010) (full judgment 
available in French only).
34 Ibid para 52.
35 Ibid para 49.
36 Ibid para. 50.
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to be an unjustifi ed interference and thus a violation of Article 9,37 but this case also 
shows a greater willingness to balance the interest of applicants in their freedom to 
manifest their religion or belief with the interests of the State Party in restricting 
this freedom.
Th is willingness was also apparent in Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom,38 
where the Strasbourg Court had to deal with two Christian applicants who both 
wanted to wear a cross in a visible way with their uniform. Eweida, who, as stated 
above, worked as check-in staff  for British Airways, and Chaplin, who worked as a 
nurse, were both prohibited from wearing a cross in this way because this was against 
their employer’s uniform policy. Th e Strasbourg Court held that their wish to wear a 
cross in a visible manner was a manifestation of their belief and that the respective 
uniform policies were an interference with this right.39 When it came to the question 
of justifi cation, the Strasbourg Court concluded that, in Eweida’s case, a fair balance 
had not been struck between her right to freely manifest her religion and British 
Airways’ wish to protect its corporate image and that the domestic courts had given 
too much weight to the latter.40 However, in relation to Chaplin, the balance between 
the interests involved was held to have been struck in the right way because the reason 
for asking Chaplin to remove her cross was the protection of health and safety on a 
hospital ward, and this was inherently of much greater importance than that which 
applied in respect of Eweida.41
Th e Strasbourg Court thus considered the justifi cation and proportionality 
question in more detail than it has oft en done in the past and gave greater weight to 
the importance of the manifestation for the applicants themselves, something that 
was completely absent in Dahlab v. Swtizerland42 and Leyla Sahin v. Turkey.43 Th e 
Strasbourg Court considered that ‘on one side of the scales was Eweida’s desire to 
manifest her religious belief ’44 and that ‘as in Eweida’s case, the importance for the 
37 Th e Strasbourg Court (Grand Chamber) will get a chance to decide on this in SAS v France App no 
43835/11, which concerns a challenge to the French legal ban on all face covering clothing in public 
places. A violation of Arts. 3 (prohibition of torture and inhumane and degrading treatment), 
8, 9, 10, 11 and 14 is claimed. Th e case was heard by the Grand Chamber on 27 November 2013, 
aft er the Chamber, in May 2013, relinquished jurisdiction (for a summary of this hearing see: 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/11/29/s-a-s-v-france-a-short-summary-of-an-interesting-
hearing/). It is, at time of writing (March 2014), not known when the judgment will be published.
38 Eweida and Others v the United Kingdom App nos 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10 
(ECHR, 27  May 2013). Th ese four cases (Eweida, Chaplin, Ladele and McFarlane) were heard 
together but the latter two did not concern the wearing of religious symbols and will therefore not 
be discussed here.
39 Ibid paras 89, 91 and 97.
40 Ibid para 94.
41 Ibid para 99.
42 Dahlab v Swtizerland (n 14).
43 Leyla Sahin v Turkey (n 21).
44 Eweida and Others v the United Kingdom (n 38) para 94.
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second applicant [Chaplin] of being permitted to manifest her religion by wearing her 
cross visibly must weigh heavily in the balance’.45
Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey46 and to an even greater extent, Eweida and 
Others v. the UK,47 can thus be seen as signifi cant because in these cases the Strasbourg 
Court, for the fi rst time in cases relating to bans on the wearing of religious symbols as 
manifestation of a person’s religion or belief under Article 9 ECHR, applied a stricter 
proportionality test which included giving weight to the importance of the religious 
manifestation for the individual applicant. Th is is a signifi cant development and, if the 
Strasbourg Court continues on this route, persons aff ected by bans on the wearing of 
religious symbols would have more chance of challenging such bans successfully or, at 
least, will have their interests in being able to manifest their beliefs taken into account 
by the Strasbourg Court. It can be assumed that the judgment in Eweida and Others 
v. the UK is leading, as the Chamber held a public hearing, indicating that the issues 
at stake in this case were rather important. And, referral to the Grand Chamber was 
refused, which seems to indicate that the judgment did not raise a serious question 
aff ecting the interpretation or application of the Convention (Article 43 ECHR).
2.3. ARTICLE 14 ECHR
Article  14 ECHR prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms set forth in the Convention on a large number of grounds.48 Bans on the 
wearing of religious symbols could possibly be a violation of Article 14 as they could 
constitute religious or other forms of discrimination. Article  14 does not give any 
indication whether and in what circumstances discrimination can be justifi ed, but 
the Strasbourg Court has held that it does not forbid every diff erence in treatment. 
Th e equal treatment principle in Article  14 is violated if the distinction has no 
objective and reasonable justifi cation. And, to be justifi ed, a diff erence in treatment 
must not only pursue a legitimate aim, there must also be a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.49 Th is 
45 Ibid para 99. On 27  May 2013, the Grand Chamber rejected a request for referral to the Grand 
Chamber, so the judgment is fi nal: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-press/pages/search.
aspx?i=003–4372554–5248315#{%22itemid%22:[%22003–4372554–5248315%22]}.
46 Ahmet Arslan and Others v Turkey (n 33).
47 Eweida and Others v the United Kingdom (n 38).
48 Article  14 does not provide a freestanding right to non-discrimination, it only prohibits 
discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights in the ECHR. Protocol 12 ECHR does provide a 
free-standing right to non-discrimination of ‘any right set forth by law’. Th e Strasbourg Court, in, 
Sejdic and Finci v Bosnia Herzegovina App nos 27996/06 and 34836/06 (ECHR, 22 December 2009) 
has held that Protocol 12 should be interpreted in the same way as Article 14. So the following on 
justifi cation under Article 14 would apply to Protocol 12 as well. Protocol 12 has only been ratifi ed 
by 18 Council of Europe Member States, of which eight EU Member States.
49 Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium v 
Belgium App nos 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63 and 2126/64 (ECHR 1979–1980) 1 
EHRR 252, under THE LAW, at B, para 10.
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test is, therefore, very similar to the justifi cation test of Article 9(2) ECHR analysed 
above, especially as, here again, ‘the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of 
appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent diff erences in otherwise similar 
situations justify a diff erent treatment’.50 Th e EU uses similar justifi cation tests 
under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and under EU anti-discrimination 
law as will be clear from the following, and thus it is useful to discuss some of the 
Article 14 case law.
2.4. CASE LAW UNDER ARTICLE 14 ECHR
As mentioned, Article 14 can only be invoked in conjunction with one or more other 
articles of the ECHR. Because of this, the Strasbourg Court oft en does not fi nd it 
necessary to consider whether there is a breach of Article 14 or it will fi nd that no 
separate question arises under Article 14.51 In some of the cases concerning bans on 
the wearing of religious symbols discussed before, where the Strasbourg Court has 
considered the discrimination claim, it has held that the rules banning the religious 
symbol were not specifi cally concerned with religious affi  liation or sex. Instead, 
the Strasbourg Court examined the aims of the rules and decided that these were 
legitimate and that there was, thus, no discrimination.52 In Dahlab v. Switzerland 
and Kurtulmus v. Turkey, the Strasbourg Court stated that the rule on the wearing of 
religious symbols applied to men as well as women and in Kōse and Others v. Turkey, the 
rule was said to be applicable equally to boys.53 For example, in Dahlab v. Switzerland, 
the Court held that ‘the measure could also be applied to a man who, in similar 
circumstances, wore clothing that clearly identifi ed him as a member of a diff erent 
faith’.54 In Aktas and Others v. France, it was held that the rules were applicable to all 
religious symbols and thus did not constitute religious discrimination.55 Th erefore, 
even where Article  14 is considered, there does not seem to be any consideration 
of whether there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be realised.
Th e above suggests that a claim that bans on the wearing of religious symbols are 
discriminatory under Article 14 is unlikely to be successful and therefore does not 
50 Willis v the United Kingdom App no 36042/97 (ECHR 11 September 2002) para 39.
51 See, for example, Eweida and Others v the United Kingdom (n 38), where, in relation to Eweida, the 
Strasbourg Court did not fi nd it necessary to examine the claim under Article 14 in conjunction 
with Article 9 separately (para 95). While, in relation to Chaplin, it considered that, as the factors 
to be weighed in the balance when assessing proportionality under Article 14 taken in conjunction 
with Article 9 would be similar, there was no basis to fi nd a violation of Article 14 (para 101).
52 Dahlab v Switzerland (n 14); Leyla Sahin v Turkey (n 21); and Kōse and Others v Turkey; Kurtulmus 
v Turkey; and Aktas and Others v France (n 32).
53 Dahlab v Switzerland supra note 14, under THE LAW, point 2; Kurtulmus v Turkey (n 32) at C of the 
considerations of the law; Kōse and Others v Turkey (n 32) at D of the considerations of the law.
54 Dahlab v Switzerland (n 14) under THE LAW, point 2.
55 Aktas and Others v France (n 32) para 3.
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assist persons who want to wear religious symbols as a manifestation of their religion 
or belief in overturning such bans. Until recently, this also appeared to be the case for 
claims of a violation of Article 9, but Ahmed Arslan and Others v. Turkey56 and Eweida 
and Others v. the United Kingdom57 appear to indicate that the Strasbourg Court is 
more willing to examine whether such bans are justifi ed and proportionate and to 
give more weight to the importance of the religious manifestation for the person 
concerned. However, the fi rst case was diff erent from the other cases of the Strasbourg 
Court on bans on the wearing of religious symbols, as it concerned a ban in public 
areas open to all rather than a specifi c ban in public establishments. But what would 
the Luxembourg Court decide if it was asked to examine this issue?
3. BANS ON THE WEARING OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN 
EU LAW
Bans on the wearing of religious symbols could possibly breach Article 10 (freedom 
of religion) and Article  21 (prohibition of discrimination) of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. Furthermore, such bans could constitute discrimination on 
the ground of religion or belief, but also on other grounds such a gender and racial 
or ethnic origin. Th ey could also be considered discrimination on a combination of 
these grounds. A ban on all religious symbols can be seen as direct religion or belief 
discrimination between those with and those without a religion. Banning religious 
symbols of one religion only and allowing symbols from others would also amount 
to direct religious discrimination. Dress rules banning Muslim headscarves and face 
veils but allowing Sikh turbans and Jewish skull caps would be directly discriminatory 
against women on the grounds of both gender and religion. Furthermore, neutral 
dress codes which prohibit all religious symbols could be indirectly discriminatory on 
the grounds of religion because they disproportionally aff ect non-Christian religions 
which are more likely to have specifi c dress requirements. Th is could also amount 
to indirect race discrimination, as the majority of the people aff ected by such bans 
would be of non-Western origin. Bans on such dress codes could also be indirectly 
discriminatory against women58 because, as Blair writes, ‘the dress requirements 
of males from ethnic minority groups (Sikhs apart) have seldom caused problems. 
Women much more than men are subject to highly restricted dress codes’.59
56 Ahmed Arslan and Others v Turkey (n 33).
57 Eweida and Others v the United Kingdom (n 38).
58 See further Titia Loenen, ‘Th e Headscarf Debate Approaching the Intersection of Sex, Religion and 
Race under the European Convention on Human Rights and EC Equality Law’ in Dagmar Schiek 
and Victoria Chege (eds), European Union Non-Discrimination Law Comparative Perspectives 
on Multidimensional Equality Law (Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) 313–328, 320–323; and Sarah 
Haverkort-Speekenbrink (n 4) 90–96.
59 Ann Blair, ‘Case Commentary: R (SB) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School – Human 
Rights and Religious Dress in Schools’ (2005) 17(3) Child and Family Law Quarterly, 399–413, 411.
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In the following, the specifi c focus will be on the justifi cation test, including the 
proportionality requirement, used in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and in 
EU anti-discrimination law, as these tests are similar to the tests under Articles 9 and 
14 of the ECHR and a comparison will be made between the way the Strasbourg Court 
has used the justifi cation test and the likely use of the similar test by the Luxembourg 
Court.
3.1. EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Article  10(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights echoes Article  9(1) ECHR, 
but there is no second paragraph similar to Article 9(2). However, Article 52(1) of the 
Charter determines that any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms 
in the Charter must be ‘provided for by law and respect the essence of those right 
and freedoms’. Any limitations must be ‘subject to the principle of proportionality’ 
and they ‘may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives 
of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others’. According to the Explanations,60 this is based on the case law of 
the Luxembourg Court which held, in Karlsson and Others, that restrictions may be 
imposed on the exercise of fundamental rights provided that those restrictions ‘do 
not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, disproportionate and unreasonable 
interference undermining the very substance of those rights’.61 Th erefore, here again, 
the measure must be proportionate and necessary and must pursue a legitimate aim.
As already pointed out, this justifi cation test is similar to the objective justifi cation 
tests under Articles 9 and 14 ECHR and, therefore, it might very well be interpreted 
by the Luxembourg Court in the same way because Article 52(3) of the EU Charter 
determines that, if rights in the Charter correspond to rights guaranteed in the ECHR, 
the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those in the Convention. 
Th e Explanations make it clear that this includes limitations and that the reference to 
the ECHR includes the text and the Protocols as well as the case law of the Strasbourg 
and the Luxembourg Courts.62
Th is could suggest that the Luxembourg Court would follow the Strasbourg Court 
and would, if called upon to do so, consider bans on the wearing of religious symbols 
easily justifi ed under both Articles  10 and 21 of the EU Charter, without much 
examination or a proper proportionality test, a proper balancing of all the interests 
involved – unless it follows the Strasbourg Court in Eweida and Others v. the United 
Kingdom. But, not only the latter case can be used as an argument for the Luxembourg 
Court not to follow the Strasbourg Court’s earlier case law, another argument can be 
found in Article 52(3) of the EU Charter which determines that ‘this provision shall 
60 Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C 303/33.
61 Case 292/97 Karlsson and Others [2000] ECR I-2737, para 45.
62 Explanations (n 60). See also Case 400/10 J. McB. v L.E. [2010] ECR I-8965, para 53.
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not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection’. A third argument could 
be that the Luxembourg Court has always held that restrictions and limitations to 
individual rights in EU law, including the right not to be discriminated against, should 
be interpreted strictly.63 For example, in Johnston, the Luxembourg Court stated that 
‘a derogation from an individual right laid down in the directive64 must be interpreted 
strictly’ and that the principle of proportionality ‘requires that derogations remain 
within the limits of what is appropriate and necessary for achieving the aim in view’.65 
Th erefore, there are a number of arguments which would suggest that the Luxembourg 
Court will be stricter in its application of the justifi cation and proportionality test of 
Article 52(1) of the Charter.
3.2. EU ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW
As stated above, bans could amount to discrimination on the ground of religion or 
belief, gender and racial or ethnic origin or on a combination of these grounds. All 
these forms of discrimination are prohibited under EU law, but the areas covered 
for each ground are diff erent. Religious discrimination is prohibited by Directive 
2000/78/EC,66 which is only applicable in the area of employment and occupation, 
including vocational training.67 Gender discrimination is prohibited in the same 
area by Directive 2006/54/EC and in the area of access to and supply of goods and 
services by Directive 2004/113/EC.68 Th e latter Directive explicitly excludes education 
from its material scope (Article 3(3)). So, for example, the French school pupils who 
challenged bans on the wearing of religious symbols in school at the Strasbourg Court 
in the cases mentioned above, would not be able to claim sex discrimination under 
63 See Case 222/83 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, para 
36; Case 273/97 Sirdar v Th e Army Board and Secretary of State for Defence [1999] ECR I-7403, para 
23; Case 285/98 Kreil v Bundesrepublik Germany [2000] ECR I-69, para 20; Case 341/08 Petersen v 
Berufungsausschuss für Zahnärzte für den Bezirk Westfalen-Lippe [2010] IRLR 254, para 60; and 
Case 447/09 Prigge and Others v Deutsche Luft hansa AG [2011] ECR I-8003, paras 56 and 72. Th e 
fi rst three cases concerned sex discrimination and the EU sex discrimination directives, while the 
latter two concerned age discrimination and Directive 2000/78/EC.
64 Council Directive (EC) 76/207 on the Implementation of the Principle of Equal Treatment for Men 
and Women as Regards Access to Employment, Vocational training and Promotion, and Working 
Conditions [1976] OJ L 39/40. Th is Directive has been repealed by Directive (EC) 2006/54 on the 
Implementation of the Principle of Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment of Men and Women in 
Matters of Employment and Occupation (Recast) [2006] OJ L 204/23.
65 Johnston (n 63) paras 36 and 38. Recently repeated in Prigge (n 63) paras 56 and 72.
66 Directive (EC) 2000/78 (n 5).
67 Th ere is a Proposal from the European Commission to extend the material scope of Directive (EC) 
2000/78 beyond this but this proposal has not been adopted to date. See COM (2008) 426 Proposal 
for a Council Directive Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons Irrespective 
of Religion or Belief, Disability, Age or Sexual Orientation.
68 Directive (EC) 2004/113 Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment Between Men and Women 
in the Access to and Supply of Goods and Services [2004] OJ L 373/37.
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Directive 2004/113/EC or religious discrimination under Directive 2000/78/EC.69 
Racial or ethnic origin discrimination is prohibited by Directive 2000/43/EC,70 not 
only in employment and in access to and supply of goods and services, but also in the 
areas of social protection, including social security and health care, social advantages 
and education. It must be noted that all these Directives expressly state that they 
contain minimum standards which must be implemented by the EU Member States 
but that these States can introduce or maintain more favourable provisions. Th erefore, 
national law could prohibit all grounds of discrimination covered by EU law (and 
others) in all areas covered by Directive 2000/43/EC and in many Member States this 
is indeed the case.
All EU anti-discrimination Directives prohibit both direct and indirect 
discrimination. Direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is 
treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable 
situation, on one of the discrimination grounds covered. Indirect discrimination 
shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice 
would put persons having a particular protected characteristic – gender, racial or 
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation – at a particular 
disadvantage compared with other persons unless that provision, criterion or 
practice is objectively justifi ed by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that 
aim are appropriate and necessary. Although, as discussed, the test for justifi cation 
of indirect discrimination is very similar to the tests used for justifi cations 
on restrictions of fundamental rights in the ECHR and in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, there are some arguments in favour of the expectation that 
the Luxembourg Court will apply this test to bans on the wearing of religious 
symbols in a stricter way. Two of these arguments have already been mentioned: 
according to settled case law of the Luxembourg Court, restrictions and limitations 
to individual rights in EU law should be interpreted strictly and this includes the 
right not to be discriminated against as laid down in the EU anti-discrimination 
directives.71 And, the EU can provide more extensive protection for fundamental 
rights, which includes the right to equality and non-discrimination, than the ECHR 
does.
Th ere is a further argument in favour of the expectation that the Luxembourg 
Court is likely to scrutinise justifi cations of bans on the wearing of religious symbols 
more carefully and apply a more rigorous proportionality test than the Strasbourg 
Court generally does. Th is is the argument that, under Article 14 ECHR, justifi cation 
of both direct and indirect discrimination is possible, but EU law is stricter in this and 
does not, generally, allow for justifi cation of direct discrimination unless in specifi c 
circumstances clearly mentioned in the directives. In relation to religion and belief 
69 Kervanci and Dogru v France (n13) and Aktas and Others v France (n 32).
70 Directive (EC) 2000/43 Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons Irrespective 
of Racial or Ethnic Origin [2000] OJ L 180/22.
71 Th is is clear from the cases (n 63).
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discrimination, Directive 2000/78/EC only mentions, as such exceptions, genuine 
occupational requirements (Article  4 (1) and (2)) and positive action (Article  7). 
Genuine occupational requirements are subject to a justifi cation test similar to the 
ones discussed earlier: the objective must be legitimate and the requirement must 
be proportionate. However, Directive 2000/78/EC also contains a general exception 
clause, applicable to all grounds of discrimination covered by the Directive. Article 2(5) 
determines:
Th is Directive shall be without prejudice to measures laid down by national law which, in 
a democratic society, are necessary for public security, for the maintenance of public order 
and the prevention of criminal off ences, for the protection of health and for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.
However, despite the fact that the justifi cation and proportionality tests for indirect 
discrimination, for genuine occupational requirements and under Article  2(5), are 
very similar to the justifi cation tests under Articles 9 and 14 ECHR, here too, there are 
a number of indications that the Luxembourg Court will apply these tests more strictly. 
First of all, the justifi cation test for indirect sex discrimination comprises, according 
to the Luxembourg Court in Bilka Kaufh aus,72 three parts: the means chosen must 
correspond to a real need; they must be appropriate with a view to achieving the 
objective pursued; and they must be necessary to that end. Th is is a strict test and it 
includes a consideration of the question of whether there is an alternative, less far-
reaching and less discriminatory way of achieving the aim pursued.73 Th is clearly 
means that the interests of the individual applicant must be taken into account and 
weighed in the balance and if there is an alternative which aff ects the individual less, 
than that alternative should be chosen. It is submitted that this test is stricter than the 
justifi cation and proportionality test as applied by the Strasbourg Court. Moreover, 
as the objective justifi cation test for indirect sex discrimination is formulated in the 
same way as the tests for indirect discrimination on the other discrimination grounds 
covered by EU law, there appears to be no reason why this should not also apply to 
indirect discrimination on those other grounds, including religion or belief.74 Or 
should there be a less strict test in relation to religion and belief? Vickers discusses 
this issue and writes:
It is arguable that such a high standard of justifi cation is not appropriate in cases of religion 
and belief discrimination, as it would lead to diffi  culties for employers who attempt to 
72 Case 170/84 Bilka Kaufh aus GMBH v Karin Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607, para 36.
73 Dagmar Schiek, ‘Indirect Discrimination’ in Dagmar Schiek, Lisa Waddington and Mark Bell (eds), 
Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supernational and International Non-Discrimination Law 
(Hart Publishing, 2007) 323–475, 357. See also on this ‘other means test’ or ‘least onerous means 
test’: Haverkort-Speekenbrink (n 4) 76.
74 Compare Article 2(1)(b) Directive (EC) 2006/54 and 2(b) Directive (EC) 2004/113 with Article 2(2)
(b) of both Directives (EC) 2000/78 and 2000/43.
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achieve a fair balance between the diff erent interests identifi ed above. Yet if diff erent 
standards of justifi cation develop with respect to religious discrimination and gender 
discrimination this will lead to inconsistencies in treatment as between diff erent grounds 
of discrimination within European Law.75
As the Luxembourg Court is generally concerned with a uniform application of EU 
law, it will want to avoid such inconsistencies and it is, thus, likely to hold that the 
same standard of justifi cation should be applied to all grounds of discrimination, 
including religion and belief.
Th ere is another point that would support a strict justifi cation test in relation 
to religion and belief (and all other grounds on which discrimination is prohibited 
under EU law): Article  6(1) of Directive 2000/78/EC determines that direct age 
discrimination can be justifi ed, that such direct discrimination shall not constitute 
discrimination if the diff erence in treatment is objectively and reasonably justifi ed 
by a legitimate aim and if the means to achieve that aim are appropriate and 
necessary. In a number of cases concerning age discrimination, the Luxembourg 
Court has discussed this objective justifi cation test.76 In Heyday, the Luxembourg 
Court stated that Article  6(1) of Directive 2000/78/EC imposes on the Member 
States the burden of establishing to a high standard of proof the legitimacy of 
the aim pursued.77 Th erefore, the Luxembourg Court will not easily accept that 
a measure which directly discriminates on the grounds of age is justifi ed.78 Th at a 
high standard of proof is also required for the justifi cation of genuine occupational 
requirements in relation to age is confi rmed in Wolf and Prigge.79 In both Petersen 
and Prigge, the Luxembourg Court held that Article  2(5), as an exception to the 
principle of the prohibition of discrimination, must be interpreted strictly and that 
the terms used in Article 2(5) also suggest such an approach.80 It can be argued that 
if a high standard of proof is required for justifi cations of direct age discrimination, 
where Directive 2000/78/EC allows for a fairly wide range of justifi cations, the 
Luxembourg Court will very likely require a high standard of proof for justifi cations 
75 Lucy Vickers, Religion and Belief Discrimination in Employment – EU Law (Offi  ce for Offi  cial 
Publications, 2006) 14.
76 See, for example Case 144/04 Mangold v Helm (n 6); Case 411–05 Felix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefi el 
Servicios [2007] ECR I-8481; Case 555/07 Kucukdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co KG (n 6); and, Case 
388/07 R on behalf of the Incorporated Trustees of the National Council on Ageing (Age Concern 
England) v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2009] ECR I-1569 
(hereaft er referred to as the Heyday case).
77 Heyday (n 76) para 65.
78 See for a more extensive discussion of this: Erica Howard, ‘EU Equality Law: Th ree Recent 
Developments’ (2011) 17(6) European Law Journal, 785–803.
79 Case 229/08 Wolf v Stadt Frankfurt am Main [2010] ECR I-1; and Prigge (n 63) para 72.
80 Petersen (n 63) para 60; and Prigge para 56 (n 63).
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on other grounds provided for in the anti-discrimination directives. As Henrard 
mentions:
Th e baseline level of scrutiny of the ECJ tends to be rather high, even for a ground such as 
age […] whereas there are many more legitimate reasons to distinguish on the basis of age 
than, for example, on the basis of gender or race.81
Haverkort-Speekenbrink suggests that the scrutiny might be even higher for other 
grounds where she writes that ‘the fact that the legislature included a general 
justifi cation clause for only age discrimination may be considered a sign that the ECJ 
would be more lenient towards this ground compared to other grounds’.82
Th erefore, all the above arguments support the application of a strict justifi cation 
test in EU law which would thus lead the Luxembourg Court to scrutinise the 
proportionality of bans on the wearing of religious symbols more rigorously than the 
Strasbourg Court oft en appears to do.
A fourth argument in favour of the expectation that the Luxembourg Court is likely 
to scrutinise justifi cations of bans on the wearing of religious symbols more carefully 
than the Strasbourg Court can be found in the fact that the Strasbourg Court, as 
discussed above, leaves a margin of appreciation to the States Parties and thus leaves 
room for a possible diff erent interpretation in diff erent States, while the Luxembourg 
Court is generally more concerned with uniform application and interpretation of 
EU law and there is less scope for a diverse application.83 Th is diff erence is related 
to the fact that the two courts were set up for diff erent purposes and have diff erent 
functions, as Douglas-Scott points out: the Strasbourg Court was set up as a human 
rights court to protect individuals against human rights abuses by the States Parties, 
while the Luxembourg Court was established with a much broader jurisdiction.84 
Alidadi also mentions the diff erent roles of these courts and writes that the fact that, 
according to article 288(3) TFEU:
the EU Directives are binding as to the result achieved justifi es a much more guided case 
law from the ECJ in the area of religious employment discrimination. Arguments based 
on the free movement of workers in the private sector, an important objective of the EU, 
could strengthen the case for clarity of guidance and require a level of uniformity across 
the Member States.85
81 Kristin Henrard, ‘Duties of Reasonable Accommodation in Relation to Religion and the European 
Court of Human Rights: A Closer Look at the Prohibition of Discrimination, the Freedom of 
Religion and Related Duties of State Neutrality’ (2012) 5(1) Erasmus Law Review 71–72, footnote 88.
82 Haverkort-Speekenbrink (n 4) 230.
83 See Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing 
Human Rights Acquis’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review, 645–682, 650; and Loenen (n 58) 316.
84 Douglas-Scott, ibid 632.
85 Katayoun Alidadi, ‘Muslim Women made Redundant: Unintended Signals in Belgian and Dutch 
Case Law on Religious Dress in Private Sector Employment and Unemployment’ in Katayoun 
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Th e fact that bans on the wearing of religious symbols could impede free movement 
is another argument in favour of the expectation that the Luxembourg Court will 
scrutinise justifi cations of such bans very thoroughly. As Haverkort-Speekenbrink 
writes ‘a fi eld in which the ECJ applies the strictest assessment of all is where a 
diff erence in treatment touches upon the freedom of movement’.86
Moreover, not only the objective of free movement of workers could be hindered 
by bans on the wearing of religious symbols at work, other objectives of the EU 
could be aff ected as well. Recital 11 of the Preamble to Directive 2000/78/EC states 
that discrimination may undermine the achievement of the objectives of the EU, 
‘in particular the attainment of a high level of employment and social protection, 
raising the standard of living, economic and social cohesion and solidarity, and the 
free movement of persons’. Bans could hinder the achievement of all these objectives: 
if people cannot wear their religious symbols at work, they might not get a job or 
they might lose their job and become unemployed and therefore, might not be able to 
earn enough to maintain a certain standard of living or take part in society and thus 
they might get isolated from that society. Bans on the wearing of religious symbols in 
some Member States and not in others might also hinder the freedom of movement 
of the persons aff ected by these bans. Th is might therefore be another reason why the 
Luxembourg Court might decide that bans on the wearing of religious symbols are 
discriminatory and thus prohibited by EU law.
4. CONCLUSION
In this article, it has been argued that persons who are aff ected by bans on the wearing 
of religious symbols, if they can get their case referred for a preliminary reference to 
the Luxembourg Court – and, there is a clear role for advocates/representatives in 
national cases to raise questions concerning EU anti-discrimination law which could 
lead to such a reference, as was discussed above – might have a better chance of a 
successful challenge to such bans in that Court than in the Strasbourg Court. Th is is 
based on the expectation that the Luxembourg Court will apply a stricter justifi cation 
and proportionality test than the Strasbourg Court has done in most cases. It is 
submitted that a stricter application of this test is desirable because it means that 
the Court will perform a more rigorous balancing of all the interests involved and 
will give more weight to the importance of the right of the individual who wants to 
manifest his or her religion through the wearing of religious symbols. Th e Strasbourg 
Alidadi, Marie-Claire Foblets and Jogchum Vrielink (eds) A Test of Faith? Religious Diversity and 
Accommodation in the European Workplace (Ashgate, Farnham/Burlington, 2012) 258–259.
86 Haverkort-Speekenbrink (n 4) 237. See also the same author at 109, where she writes that a more 
rigorous scrutiny is applied in cases that touch upon the fundamental principle of the freedom of 
movement.
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Court has, in many cases, been rather deferential to the opinion of the State Party 
without giving attention to the interest of the individual aff ected.
Four main arguments have been brought forward to support the expectation that 
the Luxembourg Court will apply a stricter justifi cation and proportionality test in 
cases where it is claimed that bans on the wearing of religious symbols constitute a 
violation of human rights or a breach of anti-discrimination law. First, the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights states explicitly, in Article 52(3), that Union law can provide 
more protection than that provided by the ECHR and thus the Luxembourg Court 
does not have to follow the restrictions in the case law on the freedom to manifest one’s 
religion of the Strasbourg Court. Second, the Luxembourg Court has consistently held 
that restrictions and limitations to individual rights in EU law, including the right to 
equality and non-discrimination, should be interpreted strictly.
Th ird, EU law does not generally allow for justifi cation of direct discrimination 
except in certain circumstances prescribed by the anti-discrimination directives, while 
Article 14 ECHR allows for justifi cation of both direct and indirect discrimination. 
Th is could already indicate that the EU is stricter in applying the justifi cation 
test. More support for this can be found in the fact that, in relation to indirect sex 
discrimination, a strict justifi cation test has been applied.87 Because the indirect 
discrimination provisions under all EU anti-discrimination directives are formulated 
in the same way and because the Luxembourg Court is very likely to want to avoid 
inconsistencies in EU law, it can be expected that the same standard of justifi cation 
would be applied to all grounds of discrimination, including religion and belief. Th is 
is further supported by the Luxembourg Court’s case law on age discrimination 
which shows that, even though justifi cation of direct age discrimination is specifi cally 
provided for in Article 6 of Directive 2000/78/EC, the Luxembourg Court requires a 
high standard of proof to fi nd age discrimination justifi ed. If the Luxembourg Court 
does so in relation to age discrimination, where a fairly wide range of justifi cations are 
allowed, then this Court would very likely require a high standard of proof for other 
justifi cations in the anti-discrimination directives. All this supports the argument 
that the application of the justifi cation test in EU law will be stricter and this stricter 
application will lead the Luxembourg Court to scrutinise the proportionality of 
bans on the wearing of religious symbols more rigorously than the Strasbourg Court 
appears to do.
Fourth, the Strasbourg Court leaves a margin of appreciation to the States Parties, 
while the Luxembourg Court is generally more concerned with uniform application 
and interpretation of EU law and there is less scope for a diverse application. 
Th is reduced scope is compounded by the fact that religious and other forms of 
discrimination – and bans on the wearing of religious symbols can be seen as such – 
may undermine the achievement of a number of the objectives of the EU, including 
the fundamental principle of freedom of movement.
87 See Bilka Kaufh aus (n 72).
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All of the above arguments suggest that the Luxembourg Court might well apply 
a more rigorous justifi cation test and scrutinise claims against bans on the wearing of 
religious symbols more thoroughly. On the other hand, as Haverkort-Speekenbrink 
writes about the Islamic headscarf specifi cally,
it is not improbable that the ECJ would be very cautious with the issue of the Islamic 
headscarf. Aft er all, there is a clear approach by the ECtHR on this issue. Th e ECJ might 
consider that it does not want to get in the way of the ECtHR. In addition, as said, Member 
States are very sensitive when it comes to this subject.88
It is submitted that the Luxembourg Court should not be cautious at all with the 
manifestation of religion or belief through the wearing of religious symbols nor 
should it follow the Strasbourg Court but, instead, it should apply a strict and rigorous 
justifi cation and proportionality test to bans on the wearing of religious symbols as 
this would ensure a better balancing of the interests of individuals in being able to 
manifest their religion. Or, as Pitt writes:
As many commentators regard the European Court of Human Rights as having taken an 
unduly narrow view of the protection off ered by Article 9 [ECHR] in relation to claims 
by employees, if a similar approach is taken to the legal interpretation of the Directive 
[2000/78/EC], the Directive may be found to have a disappointingly limited impact.89
Th ere is another reason why it is submitted that the Luxembourg Court should apply a 
strict justifi cation and proportionality test. Iglesias Sanchez refers to the ‘boomerang’ 
eff ect of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on the Strasbourg and Luxembourg 
Courts, where both infl uence each other’s case law.90 If the Luxembourg Court applies 
a stricter test for both the justifi cation under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and under the anti-discrimination directives, this might then lead the Strasbourg 
Court to scrutinise the justifi cations brought forward by States for bans on the 
wearing of religious symbols in a more rigorous way. Ahmet Arslan v. Turkey91 and 
Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom92 could be an indication that the Strasbourg 
Court is moving in that direction anyway. Especially in Eweida, the Strasbourg 
Court gave more weight to what is at stake for the individual applicant who wants 
to manifest their religion through the wearing of a religious symbol. Th is decision 
88 Haverkort-Speekenbrink (n 4) 292.
89 Gwyneth Pitt, ‘Religion and Belief: Aiming at the Right Target?’ in Helen Meenan (ed.) Equality 
Law in an Enlarged European Union Understanding the Article 13 Directives (Cambridge University 
Press, 2007) 202–230, 209.
90 Sara Iglesias Sanchez, ‘Th e Court and the Charter: the Impact of the Entry into Force of the Lisbon 
Treaty on the ECJ’s Approach to Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review, 
1565–1612, 1570.
91 Ahmet Arslan and Others v Turkey (n 33).
92 Eweida and Chaplin v the United Kingdom (n 38).
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contrasted with the way the Strasbourg Court had dealt with its earlier cases on the 
wearing of religious symbols, where it had been rather deferential to the arguments 
of the States Parties and aff orded them a very wide margin of appreciation. So, the 
Strasbourg Court appears to be already moving towards more scrutiny and a stricter 
justifi cation test and the Luxembourg Court applying such a test could encourage this 
development.
Th e Luxembourg Court’s decisions might infl uence the Strasbourg Court’s 
judgments in another way. If the Luxembourg Court applies a stricter justifi cation test 
to bans on the wearing of religious symbols and, by doing so, provides more guidance 
and requires a certain level of uniformity across the EU Member States, this might 
then be taken by the Strasbourg Court as a very tentative move towards the emergence 
of a common European consensus in this area, although the Council of Europe has 
47 Member States and the EU has only 28. Th e Strasbourg Court might then apply a 
narrower margin of appreciation and scrutinise justifi cations more closely.
However, a caveat needs to be added, as the ‘boomerang’ eff ect could also mean 
that the Luxembourg Court will be infl uenced by the Strasbourg Court’s case law in 
this area. As Loenen points out, the Luxembourg Court could follow the Strasbourg 
Court and leave some measure of discretion to the Member States in implementing 
and applying the provisions against religious discrimination.93 Loenen writes that 
a deferential approach by the Luxembourg Court could lead to ‘widely diverging 
outcomes of transposing the equality directives in this area: they may come to 
mean entirely diff erent things in diff erent countries’.94 As the issue engages sex 
discrimination as well, a relaxation of the standards in relation to sex discrimination, 
and subsequently other forms of discrimination, could follow. It is submitted that this 
would lead to reduced protection against discrimination on all the grounds covered by 
EU anti-discrimination law and that this is thus not a path the EU or the Luxembourg 
Court should follow. Avoiding this would, therefore, be another argument for the 
Luxembourg Court to apply the strict justifi cation test from Bilka Kaufh aus95 to bans 
on the wearing of religious symbols.
Th erefore, persons aff ected by bans on the wearing of religious symbols appear 
to have a better chance of successfully challenging such a ban, both as a breach 
of the freedom to manifest their religion and as a breach of anti-discrimination 
legislation, before the Luxembourg Court. Th is leads to a possible anomaly: while the 
Strasbourg Court is the court specifi cally tasked with upholding human rights, it is 
the Luxembourg Court that would appear to provide greater protection in relation 
to manifesting one’s religion through the wearing of religious symbols. However, the 
recent cases of Ahmet Arslan v. Turkey96 and, more specifi cally, Eweida and Others v. 
93 Titia Loenen, ‘Accommodation of Religion and Sex Equality in the Workplace under the EU Equality 
Directives: A Double Bind for the European Court of Justice’ in Alidadi et al (n 85) 103–120, at 117.
94 Ibid. 119.
95 Bilka Kaufh aus (n 72).
96 Ahmet Arslan and Others v Turkey (n 33).
Erica Howard
182 Intersentia
the United Kingdom97 could be an indication that the way the Strasbourg Court deals 
with such bans might be changing towards applying a more rigorous justifi cation and 
proportionality test.
It is submitted that both Courts should apply a strict justifi cation and 
proportionality test to bans on the wearing of religious symbols to ensure that 
the interests of the person who wants to manifest their religion in this way and 
the importance of these symbols for this individual are given proper weight when 
balanced against the interests of the State or private organisations in restricting such 
manifestations. Th e Luxembourg Court should apply the strict test it employs in sex 
discrimination cases and the Strasbourg Court should follow Eweida and Others v. 
the United Kingdom98 and further develop the stricter justifi cation test used in that 
case. Th is approach would lead to a stronger protection of manifestations of religion 
and belief through the wearing of religious symbols in both Courts and thus avoid 
the anomaly.
97 Eweida and Others v the United Kingdom (n 38).
98 Ibid.
